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Abstract 
Using firm-level data for five countries in Latin America, we find a negative and 
statistically significant link between social conflict in rural areas and ownership of 
mines. We apply an instrumental variables approach and find that this link may be 
causal. The instrument employed is altitude of the mine location—which we claim 
is uncorrelated with the dependent variable, firm ownership—but is correlated with 
social conflict. This variable serves as an ideal instrument, as it complies with the 
exclusion restriction. Our results hold to a formal test of changes in specification. 
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Despite the fact that large investment, foreign or domestic, is an essential economic policy 
for countries to grow, sometimes there are disagreements among economic agents that lead to 
protracted social conflict. This is particularly true in developing countries, which are precisely the 
ones that need investment the most. Furthermore, such conflicts tend to occur with relatively more 
frequency in poorer areas, as inhabitants tend to become suspicious on the benefits of such 
investments to themselves and to their livelihoods.1 While the reasons and motivations of social 
conflict in these areas have been studied relatively extensively (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2000), the impact on the incentives to invest, which is the other side of the 
same coin, has been rarely studied empirically. 
In this paper, we ask whether social conflict in rural areas decreases the likelihood of large 
investing in developing countries and, in particular, whether rural conflict in mining areas is 
associated with any increase in the likelihood of firm owners to sell, regardless of nationality or 
type of firm. As straightforward as this question may be, social scientists have been unable to 
disentangle the direction of the actual link between these two variables. On the one hand, it is 
reasonable to expect that non-local, large firms will bring their own corporate culture as well as 
their own way of doing business and as such may behave in ways that may be perceived as alien 
to the local rural areas, which are typically mostly composed by indigenous population. Regardless 
of whether this may be true, this may result in an increase in social friction and eventually social 
conflict. On the other hand, it is also rather plausible to expect that rural communities with records 
of social conflict may have a bearing on the probability of owners to establish business interests 
                                                            





in such problematic areas. This is particularly true in the mining sector where very large initial 
investments are required (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2012). 
While both questions are equally important, in this paper we study the specific question 
that goes from social conflict in rural areas to ownership. The reason for doing this is that, 
according to the conventional wisdom, there is a generalized belief that mining interests in 
developing countries are essentially driven by a profit motive and (while mining performance may 
be negatively impacted by social conflict in the short run) the profit motive will tend to 
predominate—thus, making longer term negative impacts resulting of social conflicts rather 
unlikely. In this context, we believe that ownership is a good proxy for long-term commitment, 
one that may help reflect whether this is true, which from our perspective makes it interesting 
question to pursue. In addition, we believe that this is an important question, as in recent years 
there has been massive domestic and foreign investment in mining exploration and exploitation in 
many developing countries, which has increased the interaction between firms and remote rural 
communities and may have also increased the chance for potential social conflict.  
The above is particularly true for Latin America, the geographical focus of this research 
and a region with comparative advantage in mining resources and where its mining related 
revenues account for a very sizable share of gross domestic product of the region. At the same 
time, this is a continent where most mining tends to be done in very poor, rural, and indigenous 
areas that are typically located at very high altitude. Latin America has long been recognized as a 
region with a strong comparative advantage in natural resources. This, along with the development 
of new extractive technologies, a dramatic rise in commodities prices, and a vastly improved legal 
regime, has translated into an enormous increase in investment for both mining exploration and 




countries such as Bolivia, Chile, and Perú, investment in mining activities easily accounts for 
upwards of 40 percent of the total foreign direct investment and about 10 to 15 percent of the 
annual gross domestic product. At the same time, however, externalities derived from these 
significant capital inflows have increases the likelihood of interaction between the people living 
in rural and remote regions where mining properties tend to be located with the large mining 
operations, which may increase the potential for social conflict (Bebbington and Bebbington, 
2011).  
In this paper we use an original database first collected by Haslam and Ary Tanimoune 
(2016) for the period 2011–13, which includes 640 geo-located mining properties in five Latin 
American countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, which was complemented 
with additional data on social conflicts collected by us. The advantages of these data are that they 
cover most of the mining operations in these five countries and provide systematic information at 
the firm level, something unusual in the literature where either micro-level work is performed at 
the case-study level or empirical systematic work tends to be done at higher aggregations such as 
provinces or states. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief review of the 
literature with emphasis on conflicts. This is followed by a description of the data and 
methodology. The next section shows our main findings, including a detailed description of the 
instrument employed in order to disentangle causality from social conflict to ownership. The final 
section summarizes and concludes. 
Brief Review of the Literature 




some literature on conflict and related socio-economic outcome variables. For instance, Klapper 
et al. (2012) find that heterogeneous impacts of conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire may be important by 
providing evidence that firms owned by and employing more foreign employees might have been 
affected disproportionally in terms of economic performance. These researchers argue that 
increasing hostility and differential treatment towards foreigners, as signaled by economic impacts, 
might further exacerbate social cohesion.  
Similarly, Bellows and Miguel (2009) discuss the impact of civil war on institutions, 
politics and social norms in Sierra Leone. They find that individuals whose households directly 
experienced more intense war violence are robustly more likely to attend community meetings, 
more likely to join local political and community groups, and more likely to vote, which may have 
had a bearing on the rapid postwar political and economic recoveries observed in the country after 
the civil conflict ended. Along these lines, Jennings and Sanchez-Pages (2017) study the role of 
external conflict as a force that can create social capital. They find that the presence of an outside 
threat can induce higher levels of social capital either because a protective aspect of social capital 
comes into play and/or as a reallocation of investments from private to social capital. Since the 
latter social capital is subject to free riding, the threat, by promoting a greater level of social capital, 
can be welfare improving. When the threat is severe, social capital and welfare are more likely to 
fall and find that an external threat on social capital is stronger in poor countries.  
The paper closest to ours is Menon and Sanyal (2007) which analyzes patterns of foreign 
direct investment in India. They investigate how labor conflict, credit constraints and indicators of 
a state's economic health influence location decisions of foreign firms and account for the possible 
endogeneity of labor conflict variables in modeling the location decisions of foreign firms by using 




it is well known, a weakness of employing state-specific fixed effects is that they do not control 
for endogeneity in a convincing manner. In cross-section work what is crucially important from a 
methodological perspective is to come up with a credible variable that can be used as an instrument 
one that can convincingly comply with the so-called exclusion restriction. 
Data and Methodology 
We take advantage of the fact that the data we employ are collected at the mining property 
level, which helps provide a more accurate empirical picture. As described above, Haslam and Ary 
Tanimoune (2016) collected the data around geo-located mining properties. For each set of 
property coordinates, they added firm-level economic information, socio-environmental 
characteristics of the area around the mining property, socio-economic and demographic data of 
the population living near the mining property, and information about firm-community conflicts 
at that property. While in theory our data cover the full universe of mining properties in five Latin 
American countries namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, they were further 
expanded using additional data that were available via fieldwork. 2  The inclusion of this 
complementary information allows for the analysis of the determinants of conflicts at a subnational 
level. Overall, the dataset for this paper include 640 geo-located firms at the advance exploration 
stage and above, which allows for the construction of good quality series of subnational data. It is 
important to mention that these five countries represent the largest mining economies of Latin 
America and have attracted the vast majority of foreign mining investment as demonstrated by the 
fact that the cases derived from these countries are very well represented in the case study literature 
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2012). Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables 
                                                            
2 The original data source is Infomine an industry site that collects data from stock market regulatory flings GIS information, 
country surveys, and census data. The data we employ do not include properties at the “raw prospect” or “exploration” phases, only 




employed in this paper. In addition, the variables that capture social conflict measures are manually 
constructed by Haslam and Ary Tanimoune (2016) from case summaries and news reports of Latin 
American civil society information clearinghouses. The majority of reports come from OCMAL 
(Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de America Latina), MAC (Mines and Communities) reports 
filed by the Ombudsman’s office. They were further complemented using information retrieved 
from available media by us.3 Figure 1 presents the geographical location of conflicts and mining 
properties for Latin American countries between 1998 and 2012.4  
We sort ownership shares for each mining company and select the owner with the largest 
share. While this share might or might not be a controlling one, the behavior of the owner with the 
largest number of shares is typically very significant in terms of influence and behavior to the rest 
of the shareholders as the largest shareholder is typically considered the lead owner. We use the 
share of this first owner as our dependent variable. On the other hand, our social conflict variable 
is proxied in three different ways. The first one is by using a simple dummy that accounts for the 
presence of social conflict as reported in the media. The second proxy measures duration of conflict 
in number of days. Finally, the third measure is a three-category indicator of intensity of the 
conflict as it captures the extent to which violence occurred (peaceful, violent but with no people 
hurt, and violent with people hurt). Appendix 1 provides the list of variables employed as well as 
their corresponding definitions, which include basic firm and property characteristics, socio-
                                                            
3 Media include the national newspapers “El Comercio” as well as other important newspapers with large national circulation, in 
particular, “Expreso,” “Peru 21” and “La Republica.” We also consider national television networks, which include four private 
networks (Frecuencia Latina, Panamericana Television, America Television, and Andina de Television) and the National State 
Channel (Radio Television Peruana). 
4 As Haslam and Ary Tanimoune (2016) report, 21 percent of mining properties experienced a known conflict. Of the properties 
for which no conflict was recorded, 46 percent were open-pit projects, 13 percent were combined open-pit/underground, 31 percent 
were underground, and 10 percent were surface mines. Mines that have experienced a known conflict are located at a higher altitude 
than mine that have not, respectively averaging 2260 meters above sea level against 1610 meters above sea level. Of the 133 mines 
that experienced a “known conflict”, 62.41 percent were majority-owned by foreign capital, in comparison to mines without 
conflicts of which 58.38 percent were foreign-owned. In contrast, 9.7 percent of mines without a known conflict were owned by 




environmental and livelihoods characteristics, basic socio-economic, demographic conditions of 
the nearby population, and social conflict. 
From a methodological perspective, we apply the following reduced form: 
Ownershipi = ʎ+Conflicti + Conditionsi + MineTypei +i (1) 
where, as described above, Ownership is the share of the individual or entity with largest 
ownership share of the mining firm, and Conflict is a variable that captures social conflict 
according to the three categories described above namely, presence, duration and intensity. The 
vector Conditions includes basic characteristics of the households surrounding the specific mine, 
including access to water and sewerage, infant mortality, percentage of native population and basic 
age categories. Likewise, MineType is a variable that captures whether mine extraction is 
underground or not, as more open types may exacerbate conflict for environmental reasons, while 
 is an error term. In addition, all regressions include commodity fixed effects, country fixed 
effects, mine-fixed effects and clusters at the mine level. 
Whereas linear probability estimates can only detect an association between our variable 
of interest and the dependent variable, we also pursue an instrumental variables methodology using 
the altitude of the mine as our instrument. Formally, our instrumental variables specification is as 
follows:  
Ownershipi = ʎ +E[Conflicti|Zi]+ Conditionsi + MineTypei +i (2) 
Conflicti = ɖ + ȹZi + ΩConditionsi +ΓMineTypei +ηi (3) 
where E[Conflicti|Zi] is the predicted value of the conflict variable and Zi represents the 
instrumental variable, namely the altitude in meters.  




husbandry or aquaculture are severely limited due to arid climates or high altitude, there is less 
resistance to mining. On the other hand, and as a matter of opportunity cost, it is reasonable to 
expect that the consequences of mine altitude at median or lower altitudes, with relatively abundant 
livelihood alternatives should translate in more resistance to mining. Thus, according to this view, 
our variable of interest, social conflict, is negatively correlated with the instrument proposed, 
altitude. Recent empirical evidence on this regard has been produced by Haslam and Ary 
Tanimoune (2016).  
In addition, the physiological literature shows that high-altitude environments can be 
debilitating as moderate hypoxia may induce substantial alterations in physiological and 
psychological parameters. This is translated in adverse changes in mood states, impairment in 
mental performance, behavior, and cognitive functioning during altitude exposure (Bahrke and 
Shukitt-Hale, 1993). More importantly, it is believed that behavioral impairments caused by ascent 
to high altitude may impact judgment as well affected. The adverse behavioral consequences of 
hypoxia are dependent on both the level of altitude and the duration at altitude. Some research 
indicates that some performance decrements induced by extreme altitudes may persist for up to a 
year or longer after individuals return to lower elevations. The neurochemical basis for mood and 
performance change, which is linked to behavioral decrements at altitude may be attributable to 
changes in neurochemistry (Shukitt-Hale and Lieberman, 1996). 
In fact, recent research shows that long-term exposure to high altitude with hypoxia may 
lead to impairment on conflict control (Ma et al., 2015). This was tested using treatment and 
control groups in which event related potentials were recorded in a flanker task or set of response 
inhibition tests used to assess the ability to suppress responses that are inappropriate in a particular 




group and the low-altitude group. By doing this, Ma et al. (2015) show cognitive conflict 
modulation, which suggests that long-term exposure to high altitude affects conflict control in the 
conflict-resolving stage, and that attention resources are decreased to resist the conflict control in 
the high-altitude group, which confirms that conflict control may be influenced by long-term 
exposure to high altitude (Ma et al., 2015). In summary, previous studies show that significant 
correlation between altitude and potential social conflict may be correlated, which is consistent 
with the necessary condition that our variable of interest should be correlated with our chosen 
instrument. 
On the other hand, it is not reasonable to expect that decisions on ownership would be 
directly linked with the altitude of the mining property. While both direct and indirect 
considerations such as profit, size of the reserve area and type of commodity may be important 
factors to proceed with investment and ownership, we believe that altitude is not one of them for 
several reasons. First, the technological barriers related to accessing mining areas located at high 
altitudes have been overcome to the point where not even the presence of domestic infrastructure 
is needed. Second, the marginal cost of accessing locations at high altitudes is negligible given the 
vast fixed costs that mining companies have to spend even before breaking ground for the first 
time—more so in times of skyrocketing prices, which coincides with our period of study (Haslam 
and Ary Tanimoune, 2016). Third, the political and administrative costs associated with obtaining 
exploration and exploitation permits are very significant and offer no economies of scale. Fourth, 
most of the countries included in this study enjoy some market power in their specific minerals 
that they produce and as such, firms interested in doing business may have some difficulties finding 
alternative countries with the same geopolitical structure where to invest in the long term.5 This is 
                                                            
5 For instance, while China ranks second in production of copper and silver in the world, it would be unrealistic to consider that 




illustrated by the fact that Latin American countries rank among the top producers of several 
minerals in the world. For instance, in 2017 Chile and Peru occupy the first and third positions, 
respectively, among top country producers of copper in the world. Similarly, Mexico and Peru 
occupy the first and third positions, respectively, among top silver producers in the world. Finally, 
Peru is among the top five producing country of gold while Mexico ranks number nine in the 
world. In addition, all the five countries considered in this paper also produce very significant 
amounts of several other minerals placing them among the top five to top 10 producing countries 
of iron ore, tin, aluminum, bauxite and several others (USGS, 2017). 
To the extent that our instrument is correlated to our variable of interest but not correlated 
to our dependent variable, our identification strategy is a sensible one; something that is supported 
by the facts presented above. As such, we are confident that any statistically significant link 
between social conflict and ownership may be considered as causal when using an instrumental 
variables approach. 
Findings 
Table 2 shows our main findings employing the full set of controls, fixed effects at the 
commodity and country level, as well as the three dependent variables regarding conflict. We find 
that all the variables employed in order to capture social conflict yield negative coefficients, which 
are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Not only is the presence of conflict linked to 
a decrease of first majority ownership in Latin American mines, but also the duration of the conflict 
as well as its intensity in terms of violence matter and have a detrimental link with ownership.  
The presence of a known social conflict reduces the first majority ownership of the mining 




the majority ownership in 6 percent. The intensity of a conflict also presents a negative impact in 
the ownership thus decreasing the biggest owner share in 3 percent when the conflict escalated to 
its following category of violence. That is, a violent conflict with no people hurt will reduce the 
share in 3 percent compared to a peaceful dispute, while a violent event where people got hurt will 
reduce it in 6 percent. 
Regarding the set of controls employed, the rate of infant mortality showed a significant 
decreasing effect over the first majority ownership of nearly one half of a percentage point in all 
the specifications, as long as an underground mine type increases the biggest owner share in 
approximately 5 percent for the three regressions. Even though the rest of variables do not show a 
significant effect, the percentage of households with no sewerage, the percent of 20-39 population 
and the open pit mine type showed a positive coefficient, whereas the share of native population 
in the locations of the mine properties revealed a negative coefficient respecting the first majority 
of ownership.  
Having in mind that these results computed through ordinary least squares can only detect 
association between variables and not causality, we present findings using instrumental variables, 
too. Table 3 shows the results using an instrumental variables approach, which indeed supports 
our causal claim. As described above, we employed the altitude of mine location in meters as our 
instrument. We believe that this instrument fulfills the assumptions required by this approach since 
altitude may be highly correlated with the presence of conflicts but unlikely that it may be 
correlated with ownership by other direct channels, ones that do not go through social conflicts. 
The results for the instrumental variables regressions are presented in Table 3. As in the 
previous case, we find that our three measures of conflict are negative and statistically significant 




in 18 percent, an increase in one day in the duration of the dispute diminish this share in almost 10 
percent, while an increase in the intensity of the struggle has a declining effect of 6 percent. The 
significance levels and sign of the respective control variables have an analogous behavior as the 
ordinary least squares estimates. Unsurprisingly, the related coefficients of the instrumented 
regression are higher than the ordinary least squares ones, which is quite expected econometrically 
as the instrumental variables is essentially capturing a LATE effect. This give support to the idea 
that we our finding is, in fact, causal.  
Finally, in Table 4 we go a step further and formally test whether our findings are robust 
to changes in specification empirical specification by systematically including additional variables 
to the specification presented in equation (1). The systematic methodology that we employ follows 
Sala-i-Martín (1997). We augment the empirical specifications used in the equation presented in 
(a) by using a pool of five ancillary variables from our dataset and add up to two at a time in order 
to perform regressions that include all possible combinations of these five additional variables 
added in pairs.6 
 The variable of interest is said to be strongly correlated or robust with the dependent 
variables if the weighted cumulative distribution function, cdf (0) is greater than or equal to 0.95. 
In the first column of Table 4, we report the non-weighted means. The second column shows the 
aggregate cdf (0) under the assumption of non-normality. Finally, the third column presents the 
standard error computed from the non-weighted variance estimate for all the regressions and in 
both cases, ordinary least squares and instrumental variables. These additional results provide 
                                                            
6 The ancillary variables included are (i) cropland in the vicinity of the mining property up to 25 kilometers; (ii) share of protected 
areas of buffer's area that overlaps with a protected area at 25 square kilometers; (iii) share of homes where the predominant 
construction material is adobe; (iv) if stockholders are foreign majority: share in capital > 50 = 1, otherwise=0; (v) market 




further support to our main findings above. 
Conclusions 
Using firm-level data for five countries in Latin America, we find a statistically significant 
link between social conflict in rural areas and ownership of mines. We apply an instrumental 
variables approach and find that the link appears to be causal, as our instrument, altitude of the 
mine location, is uncorrelated with the dependent variable, foreign ownership, although previous 
evidence indicates that it is highly correlated with social conflict, thus providing an ideal 
instrument as it complies with the exclusion restriction. Our results hold to a formal test of changes 
in specification. 
From a policy perspective, our paper shows that social conflict can have significant 
consequences for future domestic and foreign investment in countries, a crucial finding in the 
context of developing countries that constantly seek ways in which to pursue optimal economic 
reform. Our paper shows that social conflict may lead to long-term negative consequences in terms 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Dummy Social Conflict 0.482 0.321 0 1 
Conflict Duration 69.35 43.25 1 198 
Conflict Severity 1.323 0.242 0 2 
Percent HH No Sewerage 0.711 0.147 0 1 
Infant Mortality 0.358 0.242 0.165 0.835 
Percent Native Population 0.902 0.125 0.795 0.984 
Access to Piped Water 0.464 0.363 0 1 
Percent 20-39 Pop 0.535 0.261 0453 0.721 
Mine Type: Underground 0.352 0.321 0. 1 
Active Mine Status  0.957 0.08 0 1 





Table 2. Social Conflict and Ownership 
  
Dependent Variable:  
First Majority Ownership 
Presence of Conflict -11.717***   
  (3.171)   
Duration of Conflict  -5.850***  
   (1.786)  
Intensity of Conflict   -3.292*** 
    (1.106) 
Percent HH No Sewerage 0.084 0.090 0.096 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.070) 
Infant Mortality -0.443** -0.455** -0.423** 
  (0.187) (0.183) (0.185) 
Percent Native Population -0.048 -0.047 -0.057 
  (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) 
Percent 20-39 Population 0.157 0.155 0.158 
  (0.228) (0.228) (0.230) 
Mine Type: Underground 4.514** 4.627** 4.637** 
  (2.211) (2.247) (2.252) 
Mine Type: Open Pit 3.219 3.444 3.439 
 (2.720) (2.724) (2.740) 
Constant 92.664*** 92.324*** 90.327*** 
  (9.960) (9.886) (10.868) 
R-squared 0.119 0.110 0.100 
F-test 2.827 2.794 2.509 
Observations 363 363 363 
Method employed is ordinary least squares. Dependent variable is defined as dummy 
equal to one when foreign ownership is greater or equal to 50 percent. (*) Statistically 
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically 
significant at 1 percent. All regressions include commodity dummies, country fixed 
effects, neighborhood fixed effects and clusters at the neighborhood level. The following 
controls are not reported (they are all non-statistically significant): education dummies, 





Table 3. Social Conflict and Ownership: Instrumental Variables 
  
Dependent Variable:  
First Majority Ownership 
Presence of Conflict -18.333**   
  (8.551)   
Duration of Conflict  -9.823*  
   (5.399)  
Intensity of Conflict   -5.743* 
    (3.111) 
Percent HH No Sewerage 0.163 0.167 0.172 
  (0.187) (0.187) (0.189) 
Infant Mortality -0.653** -0.655** -0.712** 
  (0.287) (0.288) (0.301) 
Percent Native Population -0.111 -0.123 -0.128 
  (0.121) (0.129) (0.131) 
Percent 20-39 Population 0.457 0.488 0.470 
  (0.321) (0.328) (0.330) 
Mine Type: Underground 6.333** 6.743** 6.853** 
  (2.342) (2.443) (2.546) 
Mine Type: Open Pit 6.868 6.112 6.086 
 (4.780) (4.784) (4.746) 
Constant 91.943*** 96.964*** 96.397*** 
  (15.195) (16.426) (16.148) 
R-squared 0.177 0.178 0.169 
F-test (Stock-Yogo) 19.164 19.147 19.854 
p-value weak instrument 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Observations 363 363 363 
Instrument is altitude of mine location in meters; Dependent variable is defined as dummy 
equal to one when foreign ownership is greater or equal to 50 percent. (*) Statistically 
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically 
significant at 1 percent. All regressions include commodity dummies, country fixed effects 
and clusters at the community level. The following controls are not reported (they are all 















A. Presence     
OLS -0.764 0.215 0.945 
Inst. Var.  -1.142 0.542 0.946 
B. Duration    
OLS  -0.638 0.178 0.944 
Inst. Var.  -0.843 0.332 0.952 
C. Intensity    
OLS  -0.437 0.185 0.954 
Inst. Var. -0.563 0.311 0.958 
The ancillary variables employed are described in Footnote 5 in the text. The 
second column presents the standard deviation of the variable of interest while 
the first column shows the cumulative distribution function (0). A variable whose 
weighted cdf(0) is larger than 0.95 is significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable (i.e. robust) at a 5-percent significance level. This is shown in the third 
column. The cdf is computed assuming non-normality of the parameters 
estimated. Results are similar if we assume normality, instead. The specification 





Figure 1. Mining Properties and Social Conflict in Latin American (1998-2012) 
 





Appendix 1. Definition of Variables 
  
Presence of Conflict 
Conflict is defined as the moment when the obstacles to collective 
action among otherwise unorganized individuals are overcome, and 
coalesce in an identifiable group that makes ongoing, public 
demands on civil authorities, or the authority-delegate, in many 
cases the firm.7 It is measured as one when it is present and zero 
otherwise. 
Intensity of Conflict  
Asks about what causes collective action to deteriorate into violent 
acts: Under what conditions collective action against mining 
emerges? It is measured by the extent to which violence occurred: 
peaceful, violent but with no people hurt, and violent with people 
hurt, as reported by the media. 
Duration of Conflict 
Number of days that the conflict lasted from official announcement 
to official end as reported by the media. 
Mine Type  
Underground=1 ; Surface=2 ; Open-Pit/Underground=3 and zero 
otherwise 
Altitude  Altitude of localized mine in meters above sea level. 
Majority Ownership  If stockholders are majority: share in capital > 50 = 1, otherwise=0  
State  
If there is any State participation in the capital (Foreign-State, 
Local-State, State-Foreign, State-Local, State)=1, otherwise=0  
Commodity 
Three commodity dummies, gold, silver and copper. The 
corresponding commodity is defined as a dummy = 1, otherwise=0  
Sewage  
Share of community next to the mining property with absence of 
public utilities in particular, sewage system  
Primary education  
Share of community located next to mining property with primary 
education 
Secondary education  




Share of community located next to mining property with tertiary 
education 
Active population  
Share of population aged 20-59 in community located next to 
mining property 
Indigenous 
Share of aboriginal people in community located next to mining 
property 
Population density at 
25 km  
Density per square kilometer at 25 squares kilometers. 
Precipitation at 25 
km  
Total annual amount of precipitation in mm at 25 square kilometers 
Source: Haslam and Ary Tanimoune (2016) and own data 
                                                            
7 This approach corresponds with the definition of social protest from the contentious politics literature, which underlines the key 
features of observable participation of individuals in collective action, claims upon authority that threaten powerful interests, and 
publicness (Haslam and Ary Tanoumine, 2016). 
